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Abstract
This study is a review of three investigations of fatal air transport aircraft accidents and two reports of near fatal air transport 
aircraft incidents. All of the accident and incident reports reviewed found that the Air Transport rated pilots who caused the 
accidents and incidents were deficient in manual flightpath control skills. The study identified the following areas of manual
flightpath control skill deficiencies:  stall recovery, recovery from unusual attitudes, flightpath control for visual landing 
approaches, and rudder control during engine failure. Recommendations for training and checking procedures to address these 
skill deficiencies are proposed. Training recommendations include:  exposure to novel, unexpected stalls and unusual attitudes, 
sudden failure of auto flight systems during critical phases of flight, and increased practice of rudder control techniques during 
engine failures. Checking procedures should be modified to include closer evaluation of .all manual flightpath control skills.
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1Aircraft incident and accident summaries
The following accident and incident summaries illustrate various pilot manual control skill deficiencies. The 
summaries are limited to the portion of each report that describes the cause of the accidents and the actions that the 
pilots involved took to deal with the problems they faced. The pilots involved were fully qualified for air transport 
operations.
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Nomenclature
FMC Flight Management Computer 
FO First Officer
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
LNAV Lateral navigation performed by the Flight Management Computer (FMC)
MCP Mode Control Panel Provides inputs to the auto flight system by the pilots
ND Navigation Display
PAPI Precision approach path indicator
PM Pilot Monitoring
PF Pilot flying
PAPI Precision Approach Indicator lights
PFD Primary Flight Display
VNAV Vertical navigation performed by the FMC
1.1. Unusual attitude upset
This summary is based upon information from the final serious incident report (JSTB Sept 24, 2014) [1], 
concerning Air Nippon Flight JA16AN (A Boeing 737-700) The Flight departed Naha Japan airport bound for 
Tokyo Japan’s Narita airport on September 11, 2011at 21:00 local time. About one hour after takeoff, the Captain 
left the cockpit for a restroom break, and the cockpit door was locked according to procedure. The First Officer (FO) 
was left alone in the cockpit. The aircraft was at 41000 feet in level flight with the autopilot engaged in LNAV and 
VNAV modes. 
After a short period of time, the Captain returned to the cockpit door and performed the coded knock for the FO 
to unlock the cockpit door. The First Officer reached for the door unlock switch and inadvertently grasped the 
rudder trim control switch and set the rudder trim to the full Left position. The cockpit door did not unlock, and the 
Captain continued to knock on the door. 
The FO continued to activate the rudder trim control to the left. The rudder trim setting caused the aircraft to 
bank sharply to the left and caused the autopilot to switch to the Control Wheel Steering Mode (CWS). The FO was 
unaware that the autopilot remained engaged. (The procedure for recovery from unusual attitudes calls for the 
autopilot to be dis-engaged). The aircraft continued to roll to the left and started a 60 degree nose down descent. The 
control inputs from the autopilot tended to offset the FO’s manual control inputs. The aircraft continued to roll and 
reached a bank angle of 135 degrees and lost 6000 feet of altitude. The G forces caused by the FO's control inputs 
pinned the Captain to the cabin floor and rendered him unable to perform the emergency procedure for opening the 
cockpit door. The FO discovered the erroneous trim setting and regained control of the aircraft at 35 thousand feet. 
He unlocked the cockpit door, and the Captain reentered the cockpit. No one was seriously injured, and there was no 
damage to the aircraft. The FO had not received training for recovering from upsets at high altitudes.
1.2. Unusual attitude and stall
This example is based on information from the final accident report (BEA, 2012)[2]concerning the fatal crash of 
Air France Flight AF 447 on June 1, 2009. Air France Fight 447, an Airbus A330-203, with a crew consisting of a 
Captain, two Captain qualified First Officers(FOs), and nine flight attendants. Two hundred and sixteen passengers 
were on board. The flight departed Rio de Janeiro on May 31, 2009 at 22:00 local time, bound for Paris France. 
After departure, the aircraft climbed to 35 thousand feet. 
About one hour into the flight, the Captain put the two FOs in charge of the flight deck and retired to the crew 
rest area. At two hours and ten minutes into the flight, the aircraft’s three Pitot probes became clogged with ice. This 
caused unreliable airspeed indicationsand caused the auto pilot to disconnect suddenly. Theflight control system 
reverted to a mode that did not provide protections against over banking or stalls. Various alarms also sounded. The 
only flight instrument indications available for controlling the aircraft were the heading, bank, pitch and 
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altitudeindications on the PFD. Pitch, roll, heading and altitude indications were also available on the standby 
instruments. 
The aircraft was in level flight, between cloud layers encountering light turbulence when the pitot tubes clogged 
with ice. When the auto flight system failed, the aircraft banked slightly, but this was corrected manually by the PF 
to wings level flight. Then, for reasons unknown, the PF put the aircraft into a steep climb by setting the horizontal 
stabilizer to the full nose up position. It remained in the full nose up position until the aircraft crashed into the ocean.
The aircraft climbed to 37 thousand feet and stalled, and the stall warning sounded. The PM noted the altitude 
deviation, but neither pilot mentioned the stall warning. The aircraft remained at a high angle of attack, and slowed 
to the point where the stall warning system was inoperative.The aircraft then began to descend rapidly at10000 feet 
per minute. The aircraft’s forward speed was about 110Kts. During the descent, the Captain returned to the cockpit, 
but arrived too late to recover control of the aircraft. The aircraft remained at a forward speed of 110Kts and a 
descent rate of 10000 feet per minute until it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all on board. 
1.3. Rudder control problems during engine failure
This narration is based on information from (FAA CN: 40606810, 1989)[3], and (Carley, 1999) [4]. United Air 
Lines flight United 863, a 747-400, departed from San Francisco International Airport runway 28R at 11:39 local 
time on June 28, 1998, bound for Sydney, Australia. The aircraft weighed 850 thousand pounds, its maximum 
takeoff weight limit. The flight deck crew consisted of the Captain and three Captain-qualified First Officers (FO’s). 
A FO in the right seat performed the take off and initial climb out.
Just after lift-off, the aircraft encountered zero visibility conditions. The number three engine began to severely 
vibrate and then failed, making a loud series of banging noises. The Captain and one of the Pilot Monitoring (PMs)
started engine shutdown procedures. The FO in the right seat continued to fly the aircraft with the other PM 
observing the flight progress. The aircraft started to drift to the right due the asymmetrical thrust condition caused 
by the failed engine. The FO(PF) attempted to turn the aircraft to the left toward the prescribed engine failure track. 
He mainly used the aileron control to try to turn. This control input did not stop the aircraft drift to the right toward 
high terrain. The PF did not apply sufficient rudder control to deal with the yaw caused by the engine failure. The 
raised spoilers caused by the aileron control inputs resulted in increased drag on the aircraft which caused a decrease 
in airspeed and climb rate. The PM observing thePF flying warned him about the decreasing airspeed, but none of 
the pilots on the flight deck noticed the deviation from the prescribed course. As the aircraft approached the high 
terrain (San Bruno Mountain) northwest of the airport, the GPWS sounded. The PF raised the nose of the aircraft, 
which caused the stick shaker to activate (due to the low speed of the aircraft). The aircraft missed the high terrain 
by about one hundred feet. Upon hearing the GPWS warning and the stick shaker, the Captain took control, of the 
aircraft, increased the climb speed and retuned the aircraft to the prescribed course.
The FO flying the aircraft did not sense the yaw produced by the engine failure or note the yaw indicator in his 
PFD. He was also unaware of the drag increase caused by the large aileron control inputs and spoiler activation.
1.4. Stall recovery failure on instrument approach
The following summation is based information from NTSB accident report (NTSB/ARR-10/01, February 2, 
2010) [5]. Colgan Air Continental Connection Flight 3407departed Newark, N.J.(EWR) at 23:39 local timeon 
February 21,bound for Buffalo, N.Y(BUF).at 2119 EST. The flight crew consisted of a Captain and First Officer.
Two flight attendants and 47 passengers were also on board. The aircraft was a Bombardier DHC-8-400. Icing 
conditions were forecast for the route of flight. The crew activated the aircraft anti icing systems before takeoff. 
They also set the Increase Air Speed switch to ON. Theswitch increases stick shaker activation speeds for stall 
warnings.This feature provides added stall protection in case the aircraft control surfaces get accumulations of ice. 
The flight was uneventful until the crew started the approach for landing. The crew calculated landing and go 
around reference speeds, but the speeds they planned for landing did not account for the Increase Air Speed switch 
being ON.The reference speed they set for landing was 20 knots lower than the speed set for stick shaker activation.
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The landing gear and flaps were extended and the crew started to slow the airplane for the approach. Shortly 
thereafter, the stick shaker activated, and the autopilot disconnected. The stick shaker activated at about the 
reference speed the crew had erroneously calculated. The air craft was well above actual stall speed. Instead of 
implementing the prescribed stall recovery procedures(Increase power to Max, lower pitch, level wings, increase 
airspeed to follow the flap retraction schedule, direct the PM to retract flaps, and when control is regained, leveloff 
at a safe altitude). The Captain did not increase power and lower pitch. He pulled back on the yoke until the aircraft 
entered a full stall. The aircraft then rolled to the left. The PM retracted the flaps without a command from the 
Captain. This aggravated the stall condition. The aircraft then crashed, killing all on board. It is not known why the 
crew did not apply stall recovery procedures.
1.5. Loss of flightpath control during visual landing approach
The following narrative is based on information from NTSB report NTSB/AAR-14/01, (June 24, 2014)[6]. On 
July 6, 2013, Asiana Airline Flight 214, a Boeing 777-200ER departed from Incheon International Airport(ICN) 
Seoul, Korea on a nonstop flight to San Francisco International Airport(SFO).. The flight crew consisted of four 
pilots, three of which were qualified as Captains. The other pilot was qualified as a relief First Officer. One 
Captain(PF) was being monitored on his line checkout. He was a new Captain being given operating experience as 
part of his line qualification. One Captain(PM) was serving as instructor for the new Captain. At about 10:50 PST, 
the crew began to prepare for the approach and landing at SFO.
The crew expected to be cleared for a visual approach to RWY27L and the PF gave the crew a briefing forthe
visual approach. The weather was clear and the winds were light. The Flight was cleared for a visual approach to 
RWY 27L, to maintain 180 KTs. until it was 5 miles from the end of the runway. As the flight intercepted the ILS 
localizer for RWY 27L, (the glide slope function for the ILS was out of service, but the PAPI light system was 
operating) the aircraft was 15 miles from the runway at 5300 feet at an air speed of 210 KTs. This was close to the
altitude requiredto intercept a three degree glide slope profileto the runway. The flight started a descent, and the 
flaps were extended to Flaps 1, then to Flaps 5. The airspeed on the MCP was set to 180 KTs. and the aircraft slowed 
to 185 KTs. As the approach continued, the air craft tended to be above a three degree glide path, and the airspeed 
remained high at 185 to 190 KTs. The crew did not deploy sufficient drag to stay on a three degree glide path and 
maintain 180KTs. At nine miles from the runway, the crewextended the landing gear. The aircraft was then at 3900 
feet, and the airspeed was 185KTs. At five miles from the runway, aircraft was 450 feet above the three degree glide 
slope atan airspeed of 175 KTs. and a descent rate of 1200FPM. The approach was not stabilized. The flaps were 
then extended to Flaps 20. The aircraft slowed to allow the flaps to be extended to Flaps 30. The descent rate was 
1200FPM by the time the aircraft reached 500 feet, The PF then raised the aircraft nose and the aircraft quickly 
slowed to 137 KTs, the reference approach speed. The aircraft continued to slow. As the aircraft intercepted the three 
degree glide path, the PF left the throttles at idle, and the airspeed decayed rapidly. The aircraft descended at a high 
pitch angle below the glide path.The PF pulled back on the yoke but did not increase thrust. The low airspeed alert 
sounded, and the PM advanced the throttles to max thrust. The aircraft did not climb in time to avoid hitting the 
seawall at the end of the runway. The aircraft climbed over the seawall and skidded down the runway. The aft 
section of the fuselage broke off and the aircraft skidded to a stop just off the runway.
The PF had assumed that the auto throttles would adjust thrust to control air speed. The auto throttles were not 
engaged in a mode that controlled airspeed. The approach for landing was not stabilized, and a go around should 
have been made by the time aircraft had reached five miles from the end of the runway. The Airline operating 
procedures call for a go around if the approach is not stabilized by the time the aircraft reaches about five miles from 
the end of the runway in use.
2. Recommendations for modifying training of manual flight path control skills and for modifying checking 
procedures to more closely evaluate manual flight path control skills
These training and checking recommendations are based on findings from a report (CAST): Loss off Control 
Results and Analysis(December 14, 2000)[7], and the author’s experience training airline pilots in advanced flight 
simulators for B757/767s. The loss of manual control problems listed in the narratives above were caused by lack of 
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manual control skills in recovering from high and low altitude stalls, unusual attitudes and upsets, rudder control 
techniques and recovery from a destabilized landing approach.
2.1. Training recommendations
Training in flight simulators should include recovery from full stalls at both high-altitude and at low altitude in 
landing configurations. This training should be accomplished on initial checkouts and periodically during recurrent 
training. Particular attention should be focused on pilot manual control input. Engine failure recovery should be 
practiced just after takeoff in zero visibility conditions, in order to teach the pilot how to use the slip indicator in the 
PFD. Instructors should be trained to focus on nuances in trainee manual control techniques such as trimming and 
rudder control and how to provide training to remediate problems with these and other manual control techniques. 
Many other recommendations for training can be found in(CAST/JASAT),89-157)[7].
2.2. Checking recommendations
Checking procedures should be developed to include closer scrutiny of pilot manual control inputs including 
manual throttle operation in approaches for landing, control trim inputs and go around situations. At least one upset 
condition should be evaluated in every initial aircraft checkout and every recurrent training session (for example, 
full stall recovery). Further, at least one startle situation (such as FMC failure on an instrument landing approach) 
should be included on initial and recurrent training check rides. Checking procedures should be creatively designed
to avoid repeated “canned” problem situations.
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